General Principle of Liability (XVI)
But even before 1984 the effect of its strict application was considerably reduced by remedied statutes.
By a statute of King Edward in 1351-52 (25 ed. 3, C. 5) executors were allowed to sue for goods of the testator’s which were carried away in his lifetime, and sop in Emerson v. Amell (Annison, Emerson) (1672, 3 Salk, 160) it was held that trespass lies at the suit of an executor for cutting and carrying away growing corn in testator’s lifetime. Later, in 1833, a statute of King William, Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, C. 24), S. 2, carried the remedy further when it provided a right of action to the executors and administrators of a deceased for injuries to the real estate of the deceased committed within six months before his death and provided such action was brought within twelve months after the death of such person. The Civil Procedure Act, 1833, was by section 45 its sections were repealed, of general application throughout England, although it did not apply to Scotland and Ireland. In Thomas v. Nabhan ((1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 229) the Conveyancing Act, 1881, was held to apply to Nigeria although it did not apply to Scotland. In my view, by section 14 of the High Court Law, Eastern Nigeria, the Civil Procedure Act, 1833, applies to the Easter Region as it was of general application in England in January, 1900.
That statute being remedial in its nature, very liberal interpretations have been given to it. So that when an application was made, to substitute a party in a case pending an appeal, under the provisions of order 50, rule 4, Rules of the Supreme Court of England, 1875, in a matter which affected the Personal Estate of a deceased person, order for substitution was made… Twycross v. Grant (1878) 47 L.J.Q.B. 676).
To be continued
